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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by 
virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1990). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was the Commission's finding that a duly authorized waiver 
of the statute of limitations defense had been executed not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Petitioner identifies the following statute and rules as 
those "whose interpretation is determinative" within the meaning 
of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6): Utah Admin. R. 861-1-7A(0); and 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(8) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Commission assessed taxes against Radix pursuant to an 
audit. Radix petitions for redetermination on grounds, inter 
alia, that the three-year limitation period prescribed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-110(87) (1987) precluded assessment of taxes 
prior to December 31, 1986. The Commission ruled against Radix 
on grounds that a duly authorized limitation waiver had been 
executed. Radix petitioned for reconsideration, and the 
Commission reaffirmed its initial decision. Radix petitioned 
this Court for review and now limits its petition to the issue of 
the authority of Diane Fanger to waive the legal defenses of the 
corporation. 
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RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
1. On or about April 14, 1989, Diane P. Fanger executed a 
document entitled "Agreement, Waiver of Statutes of Limitation." 
Exhibit 4, R. 152. 
2. Ms. Fanger was the accounting manager of Radix 
Corporation. Testimony of Timothy J. Draper, Transcript at 
21:13-14. 
3. Ms. Fanger did not hold any corporate position as an 
officer or director. Id. at 21:17-19. 
4. Radix Corporation policy did not authorize any employee 
who was not a corporate officer at the level of vice-president or 
above to waive legal defenses of the corporation. Id. at 21:13-
16; Affidavit of Alan C. Reed, dated January 28, 1991, R. 129-
131. 
5. The Commission auditor does not recall whether he even 
questioned Ms. Fanger as to whether she had authority to sign the 
document. Testimony of Gary M. Allred, Transcript at 36:12-15. 
6. The Commission auditor merely assumed that Ms. Fanger 
did not require authority from another person in the corporation. 
Id. at 36:5-8. 
7. The normal procedure followed by auditors for the 
Commission is not to have a corporate officer sign a waiver of a 
limitations, but merely a person "generally in charge of 
accounting." Id. at 40:10-18. 
8. The only restriction in the Commission's normal 
procedure as explained was that a file clerk or receptionist 
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would not be acceptable to sign such a waiver but a "person in 
charge of accounting," Id. 
9. The only basis testified to by the Commission's auditor 
to conclude that Ms. Fanger had authority, besides her signing 
the document, was that she sometimes would tell the auditor she 
had to check with Mr. Draper to receive additional information to 
talk with him about something she thought it was necessary to 
talk to him about. See id. at 36:19-25. 
10. Mr. Draper's testimony and Mr. Reed's Affidavit stand 
uncontradicted as to Ms. Fanger's lack of authority to waive 
legal defenses of Radix Corporation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission failed to adduce sufficient evidence of 
implied authority to support a finding that the limitations 
waiver was authorized. The uncontradicted testimony establishes 
that Ms. Fanger had no actual authority, express or implied, to 
execute the limitations waiver. 
THE COMMISSION FAILED IN ITS BURDEN TO OVERCOME 
PETITIONER'S LIMITATIONS DEFENSE AND, FURTHER, 
UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY ESTABLISHED THAT NO 
LIMITATIONS WAIVER WAS SIGNED BY A PROPERLY AUTHORIZED 
PERSON. 
The Commission's argument that it is not outside the 
limitations period for much of its audit1 rests upon one apparent 
1
 The limitations period would bar assessments for the period 
1/1/86 to 12/31/86 which were included in the audit, in light of 
the Notice of Determination being issued on 12/12/90, by virtue of 
the three year limitations period prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-110(8)(1987). 
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premise: that Diane Fanger had authority to waive a legal 
defense on behalf of Radix Corporation. Yet, Ms. Fanger neither 
holds any corporate office nor was given specific authority to 
waive legal defenses of the corporation. The testimony of 
Timothy J. Draper was uncontradicted on this point: Mr. Draper 
testified that "company policy specifically does not give [Ms. 
Fanger] authority to sign [limitations waivers]." Transcript at 
21:13-16. See also Transcript at 21:13-19 (Ms. Fanger holds no 
corporate office). 
Nor did the Commission offer testimony or corporate 
documents from any source that would establish a grant of 
authority to Ms. Fanger by the corporation empowering her to 
waive its legal defenses. Instead, Gary M. Allred of the 
Commission admitted that he does not recall whether Ms. Fanger 
was even asked whether she had authority to sign the waiver when 
it was presented to her. Transcript at 36:12-13. Mr. Allred 
further testified that normal Commission procedure is to obtain a 
waiver from "generally, a person in charge of accounting, . 
not necessarily a [sic] officer[,]" albeit not a "file clerk or . 
. . receptionist." Transcript at 40:14-18. 
The ramifications of this "normal" Commission procedure are 
truly astounding. Rather than approach the corporate treasurer, 
who might be thought of as "the person in charge of accounting" 
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for a corporation,2 the Commission apparently seeks out whomever 
is actually supplying information to it to sign a waiver of legal 
defenses belonging to the company, regardless of their actual 
corporate office or duties. This procedure no doubt will come as 
a shock to the officers, directors and shareholders of Utah 
corporations where unauthorized employees have waived 
corporations1 valuable legal defenses at the mere instance of 
representatives of the Commission. Indeed, the concept of 
"waiver" as a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a right is 
totally at odds with the Commission's questionable choice of 
corporate employees to execute a waiver under this "procedure." 
In his closing arguments at the hearing, the Commission's 
counsel focused on the issue of implied authority.3 Yet there is 
no evidence upon which to find implied authority. First, it is 
important to keep in mind that "[i]mplied authority is actual 
2
 Even then, the Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized 
that corporate treasurers (let alone non-officer bookkeepers) are 
"commonly known . . . not ordinarily [to be] a principal officer 
who binds a corporation." Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 
815, 818 (Utah 1979). 
3
 The Commission has never claimed (and has therefore waived 
any claim of) any apparent authority on the part of Ms. Fanger. 
This, no doubt, stems from the following rule: "As [apparent 
authority] rests on the doctrine of estoppel, it cannot be invoked 
unless the person setting up the estoppel relied upon the conduct 
of the corporate agents in his or her transactions with the 
corporation." 2 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 449 at 416 (perm. ed. 1990). Clearly, the 
Commission cannot establish detrimental "reliance" by its own 
desire for a waiver. It might still today seek a lawful waiver 
from a duly authorized officer; the sole detriment to the 
Commission is that now, as then, no duly authorized officer will 
waive this defense. 
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authority circumstantially proved." Fletcher, § 438 at 387. 
Circumstantial evidence probative of actual authority is 
absent in this instance. Gary M. Allred essentially admitted he 
did nothing more that assume Ms. Fanger had authority to execute 
the waiver. See Transcript at 36:5-8. The Commission's counsel 
argued that Ms. Fanger "represented to the auditor that she had -
- she had the authority to sign such a document, and he relied on 
that based on her actions . . . " Transcript at 49:5-7. But this 
argument is not accurate; the testimony of the auditor was that 
he did not recall whether Ms. Fanger was even asked whether she 
had authority. Transcript at 36:12-13. 
The only evidence offered to the Commission to prove 
authority circumstantially was the following testimony of the 
auditor: 
Q. Did you question at any given time 
whether she had the authority to 
sign this document [the limitations 
waiver]? 
A. Well, I didn't - I can't remember, to be 
honest with you. This was back in April of 
'89. 
Q. And your statement on the previous 
document, dealing with the sample method 
projection — . . . — my question was, 
was, at any given time, did she have to 
request authorization to approve a 
document to be signed [sic] or get 
requests — 
A. Well, sometimes she wouldn't have 
information or if she thought it was 
something that Mr. Draper needed to get 
involved with, she would make that 
statement, that I — I need to talk to 
Tim Draper. 
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Q. And did she sign this document without 
hesitation? 
A. Yes. 
Transcript at 36:12-37:2. Thus, the only evidence offered 
besides the auditor's bald assumption that Ms. Fanger had 
authority was that, on occasion, Ms. Fanger would talk to Mr. 
Draper when she felt she needed to talk to him. 
This testimony does nothing more than state the obvious. 
Ms. Fanger clearly thought she could sign the limitations waiver 
or she would not have signed it. The issue on implied authority, 
however, is not what the agent "thinks" she is able to do, but 
what actual authority can be shown by circumstantial evidence to 
be vested in the agent. The Commission, in the Brief of 
Respondent, dated September 21, 1990, R 153-165, cited to Bowen 
v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978), for the proposition that 
"[i]mplied authority embraces authority to do whatever acts are 
incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish 
or perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the agent." 
Here, the only evidence presented was that Ms. Fanger is a non-
officer who runs the accounting department. No other evidence of 
any grant of authority to Ms. Fanger was offered by the 
Commission. 
The question presented thus becomes: is the authority to 
waive a legal defense of a corporation "incidental to, . . . 
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform, the main 
authority" of running an accounting department? While the head 
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of an accounting department may well be the person from whom a 
tax auditor seeks documents and information to be utilized in an 
audit, it is pure guesswork to assume that such a person is 
vested with authority to waive legal defenses of the corporation. 
Indeed, there is nothing usual or ordinary about such a person 
waiving legal defenses in the performance of their duties.4 
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Draper established that 
no policy allowed Ms. Fanger to waive legal defenses and that in 
fact, the accounting manager does not have such authority. 
Transcript at 21:10-19. This uncontradicted testimony was 
reaffirmed in the Affidavit of Alan C. Reed, dated January 28, 
1991, R 129-130. Mr. Reed explained that never in the history of 
Radix Corporation has any person other than an officer or 
director, or for that matter, anyone with a title below that of 
vice president, had any authority to execute waivers of legal 
defenses. 
If the Commission's procedure is, as was testified to by Mr. 
Allred, not to seek out officers or directors of the corporation 
to sign waivers, but simply to have any person dealing with them 
on an audit above the level of receptionist or file clerk sign 
4An analogy would be that a bookkeeper who handles the 
accounting in a law firm would be authorized to waive the legal 
defenses of the law firm without the consent of the managing 
partner or administrative shareholder. Just as lawyers in a law 
firm would be surprised to find out their bookkeeper who had been 
dealing with the auditors had waived a legal defense of the law 
firm, so, too, would any corporate officer be surprised to find 
their accounting manager had waived such legal defenses unless an 
express policy allowing such waiver existed. 
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waivers, the Commission should be required to live with the 
consequences of that procedure, or to change it. A contrary 
result merely exalts the Commission's assumptions over the facts 
shown by the evidence. If anything, the law should encourage the 
Commission to obtain waivers from persons having actual authority 
to give them. 
As a final point, the Commission has asserted that it is the 
burden of Radix Corporation to establish its limitations defense. 
Radix Corporation met its burden simply by pointing out the time 
period that is outside statutorily allowed period. The burden 
then shifted to the Commission to establish that it had a duly 
authorized waiver. 
Defendants made a prima facie showing that the 
limitation period had expired; plaintiff does not 
contend otherwise. The burden was on plaintiff to show 
there was an issue as to whether the limitation period 
had not expired when he filed his complaint. 
Irvine v. St. Joseph Hospital, Inc., 102 N.M. 572, 698 P.2d 442, 
443-44 (Ct. App. 1984) . See generally, 51 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Limitation of Actions, § 484 (1970) ("Thus, when the plaintiff's 
pleadings show upon their face that the claim sued upon is 
actually barred by the statute, then a plea of the bar interposed 
by the defendant will in effect shift the burden to the 
plaintiff, who will be obliged to produce evidence to relieve his 
claim from the bar of the statute."). 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Commission is unable to establish actual or 
implied authority of Ms. Fanger to execute such a waiver, it is 
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unable to avoid the limitations defense asserted by Radix. 
The decision of the Commission should be reversed as to the 
conclusion Ms. Fanger was authorized to execute a limitations 
defense and the matter should be remanded to the Commission with 
directions to exclude from its determination of tax owing any 
sums barred by the limitations period. 
DATED this 4 day of September, 1991. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & tf^BEKER 
D^id W. Scofield 
John B. Lindsay 
4*4 Attorneys for Pejbitione 
26526-1 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
RADIX CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 90-0991 
Account No. C35134 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on October 3, 1990. Paul F. Iwasaki, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner was 
Timothy Draper. Present and representing the Respondent was 
Rick Carlton, Assistant Attorney General. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1986 through 
December 1988. 
3. The Petitioner was audited for the 
above-mentioned period of time. As a result of that audit, a 
sales and use tax deficiency was assessed. The deficiency 
arose in several areas: (1) Purchases of produces from out of 
state sources; (2) Payments made for the purchase of brochures 
from publishers outside of Utah which were then sent to the 
Petitioner's customers; (3) Payments made to Customer Service 
Corporation by the Petitioner for use of an airplane and 
automobile owned by Customer Service; and (4) A transaction 
with a company known as "Nipsco," wherein Nipsco provided the 
Petitioner with software and the Petitioner in turn reduced the 
price of a computer system sold to Nipsco by a certain amount. 
Sales tax on the sale to Nipsco of the computer system was 
calculated on the difference between the price of the computer 
system less the amount credited for the software given in trade 
by Nipsco. 
4. Because of a lack of cooperation by the 
Petitioner, the auditor was unable to obtain all necessary 
documents. Therefore, an assessment was based upon a sampling 
method. Use of that sampling method was agreed to by the 
Petitioner's accounting manager. 
5. At the time the audit was conducted, part of the 
audit period was outside of the statute of limitations for the 
assessment of any additional tax. The accounting manager for 
the Petitioner agreed by signed waiver form, to waive the 
statute of limitations as a defense against any assessment made 
for the period in question. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount 
paid or charged for leases and rentals of tangible personal 
properties if the property site is in this state, if the lessee 
took possession in this state, or if the property is stored, 
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used, or otherwise consumed in this state. (Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-103(k).) 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount 
paid or charged for tangible personal property stored, used, or 
consumed in this state. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1).) 
The petitioning party shall have the burden of proof 
to establish that its petition shall be granted. (Utah State 
Tax Commission Administrative Rule R861-l-7A(g).) 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The threshold issue in this case is whether or not the 
Respondent is barred by the statute of limitations from 
assessing a sales tax deficiency for the period of time three 
years prior to the assessment of the deficiency. 
It is the Petitioner's contention that the statute of 
limitations bars such action in the present case because the 
Petitioner claims the accounting manager had no actual 
authority to agree to the waiver of the statute of 
limitations. The Petitioner's witness stated that the 
company's policy prohibited the accounting manager from signing 
such a document. 
It should be noted that the Petitioner presented no 
further evidence regarding the authority of the accounting 
manager either by way of a copy of the company policy, the 
company's bylaws, or the testimony of any other corporate 
officer. 
It was the testimony of the auditor that he dealt with 
the accounting manager during the audit and on no occasion did 
she ever give any indication that she was not authorized to act 
in the manner in which she did. The auditor testified that 
during the audit period he requested numerous items from the 
accounting manager and that those items were provided to him. 
Further, if there were occasions where items were requested 
which the accounting manager was not authorized to provide, she 
so informed him of that fact. Here, there was no indication by 
the accounting manager that she was not authorized to sign the 
statute of limitation waiver consent form without first having 
sought permission from any other individual. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds 
that the Petitioner's mere assertions that the accounting 
manager did not have the authority to sign the statute of 
limitation waiver agreement, when viewed in light of all the 
evidence presented, does not support a finding that the 
accounting manager acted outside the scope of her authority. 
Therefore, the Tax Commission finds that the Respondent is not 
barred from assessing a deficiency for the audit period in 
.question by the statute of limitations. 
The Commission next turns to the issue of the taxable 
status of each of the items brought into issue by the 
Petitioner. 
With respect to the freight and brochure issues, the 
Petitioner presented no evidence other than its testimony that 
there were items in the audit which should not have been 
taxed. Specifically, the Petitioner failed to present any 
documents or invoices that would support: its broad claim that 
some of the freight charges were non-taxable. Therefore, the 
Petitioner failed to meet its burden of proof. 
The same is true with the brochures in question. 
Specifically, the Petitioner claimed that those brochures were 
purchased from out of state vendors and mailed from those sites 
to customers located outside of Utah. Therefore, the 
Petitioner claimed that those items never entered Utah. Here 
again, as with the freight issue, the Petitioner offered no 
evidence other than the testimony of its witness that such 
actions occurred. No mailing lists or invoices or any such 
documents were offered to corroborate the Petitioner's claims. 
With respect to the transaction with Nipsco, wherein 
the Petitioner received software from Nipsco and then credited 
Nipsco's account in a corresponding amount, the Petitioner 
claimed that the transaction was not taxable because it did not 
receive anything of value. 
The Commission finds that in the present case, the 
software the Petitioner accepted as a "trade-in" was tangible 
personal property and not intangible property as claimed by the 
Respondent. 
Although the software may have been customized or 
created for Nipsco or some entity other than the Petitioner, it 
lost that status when it was traded or exchanged to subsequent 
parties. At that time, the software became tangible personal 
property. Therefore, sales tax applies only to the difference 
in price between the credit given for the software and the 
price of the computer system. 
With regard to the payments made by the Petitioner on 
behalf of Customer Service for use of the airplane and 
automobile, the Petitioner maintained that such payments did 
not constitute a lease or a rental agreement and, therefore, 
should not be subject to tax. Petitioner further argued that 
because Customer Service had already paid sales tax on the 
purchase of the airplane and automobile, and because Customer 
Service is a related company of Radix Corporation, additional 
tax should not be imposed. 
Although Customer Service may have paid sales tax at 
the time of the purchase of the airplane and automobile, such 
action does not prevent the imposition of subsequent taxes due 
for the rental or lease of those items. In the present case, 
Customer Service is a legal entity separate and apart from the 
Petitioner, and should be treated as such. Here, the payments 
on the loan by the Petitioner on behalf of Customer Service in 
return for use of the airplane and automobile constituted 
rentals of those items between two separate legal entities and 
were thus subject to sales tax. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds 
that with respect to all the items in the audit, with the 
exception of the software accepted as a trade-in with Nipsco, 
the Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of proof to show 
that adjustments to the audit are necessary or that the audit 
deficiency as assessed to those items is incorrect. To that 
extent, the Tax Commission affirms the determination of the 
Auditing Division. With respect to the sales transaction with 
Nipsco, the Tax Commission finds that the Auditing Division 
erred in assessing a sales tax deficiency on that transaction. 
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The Auditing Division is ordered to amend its audit report in a 
manner consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 
DATED this *R day of ^ nyvmOUA^ , 1991. 
BY ER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
~R. H. Hansen 
Chairman 
B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petilion for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 
63-46b-14(2)(a) . 
PFI/sd/0584w 
o-.*«»<,„ -/' * 
* : 
\\<%\ 
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'M 
% 
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James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing D^r 
Heber M. Wells Bldg, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Sam Vong 
Operations, Central Files 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Rick Carlton 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this S day of ^^puYV^OLKJl}^ , 1991 
;0/Y*JE 
Secretary 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
RADIX CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter camp before the Utah State Tax Commission 
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, dated January 29, 1991, 
filed by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final 
decision, dated January 10, 1991. 
FINDINGS 
1. Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides 
that a Petition for Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for 
reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the 
discovery of new evidence." Under this rule, the Tax 
Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying a 
Petition for Reconsideration. 
ORDER 
Appeal No. 90-0991 
representative was a certified public accountant who did not 
demonstrate any inability to adequately prepare and present the 
Petitioner's case. 
5. The prehearing conference on this matter was held 
on July 9, 1990, some four months prior to the date of the 
formal hearing. During that time, the Petitioner's 
representative had ample time to prepare its case, and after 
having done so, if he felt unsure or otherwise unable to 
proceed, had ample opportunity to obtain legal counsel. That 
the Petitioner's representative consciously decided not to do 
so is a risk to be borne by the Petitioner. 
6. The Petitioner's counsel also alleges that the 
Tax Commission erred in its determination that the statute of 
limitations did not apply. 
7. After having considered the argument of the 
Petitioner, the Commission finds that the facts presented at 
the hearing establish a sufficient basis for its finding that, 
as a matter of law, the Petitioner's accounting manager did not 
act outside the scope of her authority and that the statute of 
limitations was not applicable in the present case. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds 
that the assertions made by the Petitioner in its Petition for 
Reconsideration are either unsubstantiated or so insignificant 
that the granting of the Petition would not be proper. The 
Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration or, in the 
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Alternative, Conversion to Informal Adjudicative Proceeding, is 
denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this £l day of P<LXMAXOU^AK, 1991. 
BY JDRDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
A^PSCNT 
R. H. Hansen 
Chairman 
Roger 0. Tew 
Commissi 
Jqfe^ ST. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of the final 
order to file with the Supreme Court a petition for judicial 
review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 63-46b-14(2)(a). 
PFI/sd/1235w 
• | °C/j/ JSjJ 
Xh ^ u i f i 
- 4 -
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I-mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Radix Corporation 
c/o John B. Lindsay 
CALLISTER DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
10 East South Temple #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Rick Carlton 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
2\ day of F"wiUj DATED t h i s X\   V gXn QLAA-K_ , 1991 
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